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Under a Critical Race Theory Lens 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: 
A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 
By James T. Patterson 
Original Copyright 2001, by James T. Patterson 
Oxford University Press 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, Pp. 285. 
Reviewed by Carlo A. Pedrioli* 
Altogether, school desegregation has been a story of conspicuous 
achievements, flawed by marked failures, the causes of which lie beyond 
the capacity of lawyers to correct (p. 223).1 
INTRODUCTION 
With Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and Its 
Troubled Legacy, historian James T. Patterson anticipated the fiftieth 
anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Courts landmark decision Brown v. Board of 
Education.2  In Brown, the Court unanimously held that racially segregated 
schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitutions 
Fourteenth Amendment.  The decision in effect struck down de jure segregation 
in the United States.3  In holding as it did, the Court declared that in the field 
of public education the doctrine of separate but equal has no place.  Separate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal.4  Not only does Pattersons book 
capture the essence of Chief Justice Earl Warrens opinion of the Court in 
Brown, but the book also addresses the developments that have come in the 
 
* M.A. (Communication), University of Utah, 2003; J.D., University of the Pacific, 2002; B.A. 
(Communication and English) (summa cum laude), California State University, Stanislaus, 1999.  
Member, State Bar of California.  Currently, the author is a Ph.D. candidate in Communication at 
the University of Utah.  For thoughts on and a response to a previous version of this Book 
Review, the author gratefully acknowledges Brian K. Landsberg of the University of the Pacific. 
1. Quoting JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 401 (1994). 
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
3. CHARLES J. OGLETREE, ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF 
CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 310 (2004). 
4. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (legal genesis 
of the Courts separate but equal doctrine). 
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wake of the famous case.  Furthermore, Pattersons book offers an evaluation 
of the implications of Brown and its progeny.  In light of the fiftieth 
anniversary of Brown, now is an appropriate time to consider Pattersons 
critical look at Brown and its legacy. 
Accordingly, this Book Review argues that Pattersons narrative is a 
mostly balanced historical reflection.  Here, the term balanced will refer to 
giving consideration to both the negative and positive aspects of the 
phenomenon in question.  To advance its thesis, first, the Review will offer an 
overview of Pattersons historical narrative and evaluation of the Brown legacy.  
Second, the Review will analyze Pattersons conclusions through a Critical 
Race Theory lens.  Given the focus of Critical Race Theory on race and the 
law, especially on how institutions perpetuate racism against social outsiders 
through the law, Critical Race Theory is an appropriate and valuable lens for 
considering matters that receive attention in Pattersons book.5 
 
I. 
PATTERSONS HISTORICAL NARRATIVE AND EVALUATION OF THE BROWN 
LEGACY 
Patterson begins his narrative by recounting the now-familiar story of a 
U.S. school system that tolerated racial segregation before Brown (p. 16).  To 
help demonstrate the effects of such a system on minorities, Patterson points 
out that in 1954, even after some funding increases, black public schools in the 
South received only 60% of the money that white schools received (p. xvii).  
Because education requires adequate financial support, Patterson suggests that 
such an inequitable system of funding cannot have helped minority students. 
Continuing the story, Patterson explains the strategy that attorneys at the 
NAACPs Legal Defense and Education Fund employed in Brown.  Led by 
Thurgood Marshall and relying on controversial psychological studies, the 
attorneys argued that racial segregation in schools hurt minority children from 
an early age (p. 44).  The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately agreed and, in a 
much-anticipated opinion, ordered an end to constitutionally sponsored 
segregation in public education (p. 66). 
Brown is far from the end of Pattersons narrative because, as the author 
observes, shortly after Brown many problems with court-ordered desegregation 
developed.  For example, some cities refused to desegregate.  During the fall of 
1954, the town of Milford, Delaware practiced token desegregation at its high 
school, admitting only eleven black students (p. 73).  Also, racial harmony 
between white and black students in the newly integrated schools was 
strained, particularly among older students who had not grown up with 
 
5. For more on Critical Race Theory, see Section II of this Book Review. 
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desegregated schools (p. 166).  Moreover, many white families left the big 
cities and headed for the suburbs, leaving the children of black families to 
populate inner-city schools (p. 164).  Indeed, these problems would not go 
away easily. 
Although Pattersons historical narrative is insightful, the more interesting 
part of the book is Pattersons evaluation of the Brown case almost a half-
century after the Supreme Court issued the opinion.  Pattersons evaluation 
goes beyond the Brown opinion and attempts to evaluate the lasting imprint that 
the case has had on U.S. culture.  Careful in weighing the evidence, Patterson 
comes to the tentative conclusion that Brown left much remaining work in the 
desegregation of U.S. schools and society more generally, but also achieved 
much with regard to race and the law. 
In looking at several of the shortcomings of public education today, 
Patterson comments that Americas inability to desegregate many of its 
neighborhoods and schools . . . stood out in the early twenty-first century as the 
largest failure among efforts . . . to move toward greater interracial mixing (p. 
211).  For instance, during the 1998-1999 school year, 90% of Chicago public 
school students were African American or Hispanic, and 90% of Detroit public 
school students were African American (p. 211).  Moreover, during the 1996-
1997 school year, 68.8% of black public school students attended schools 
where less than half of the student body was white (p. 212).  Added to this 
background is the fact that judicially supervised desegregation in many public 
school systems in cities such as Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Minneapolis, 
Buffalo, Nashville, Grand Rapids, Jacksonville, and Mobile has ended or will 
be phased out (p. 212). 
In addition to what he calls Americas inability to desegregate (p. 211), 
Patterson notes an important educational shortcoming linked to school 
desegregation attempts and the academic development of minority students.  
On standardized tests such as the SAT, Patterson claims that black students as a 
group, regardless of class, still perform more poorly than white students as a 
group (p. 215).  Experts are unsure how to explain this phenomenon.6  Thus, for 
many Blacks the hopes of the Brown era have become an all-too-distant 
dream (p. 220), leaving the color line to become [t]he problem of the twenty-
first century (p. xxix). 
Despite his obvious concern over the lasting effects of Brown, Patterson 
still sees the 1954 case as a landmark achievement.  He notes that Brown took 
aim at the heart of constitutionally sanctioned Jim Crow and eventually helped 
to desegregate many schools in both border and Southern states (p. 221); the 
decision enabled the courts in subsequent cases to give constitutional 
standing to the changes that came with attempts at desegregation (p. 222).  
 
6. For more on the discussion of the merits of standardized testing, see note 19. 
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Furthermore, Brown had considerable, though incalculable, symbolic value, 
for liberal [W]hites as well as for many hopeful [B]lacks (p. 222).  In an 
attempt to reconcile his approval with his concerns, Patterson notes that while 
lawyers can work for social improvement, as in the case of the NAACP lawyers 
in Brown, they can do only so much.  Society has its role to play as well (p. 
223).7  Overall, Pattersons evidence seems to agree with this point. 
 
II. 
ANALYSIS OF PATTERSONS CONCLUSIONS THROUGH A CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY LENS 
As noted above, this Book Review will employ Critical Race Theory to 
evaluate Pattersons critical narrative.  Critical Race Theory is an appropriate 
intellectual tool for evaluating Pattersons conclusions because Critical Race 
Theory, like Pattersons book, deals with the intersection of law and race.8  
Specifically, Critical Race Theory addresses the law from the perspectives of 
racial outsiders, especially black individuals,9 and considers how the law 
constructs race.10  Critical Race Theory seeks to remind society how deeply 
issues of racial ideology and power continue to matter in American life.11 
Given its frequently negative focus,12 Critical Race Theory is often 
outside the mainstream of U.S. legal thought; thus, one might think of Critical 
Race Theory as relatively radical in nature.  This negative focus of many 
adherents of Critical Race Theory will be helpful in demonstrating more clearly 
how Patterson has taken a balanced approach to evaluating Brown and its 
progeny because, in addition to considering some of the negative aspects of 
history that many adherents of Critical Race Theory would address, Patterson 
also offers some positive aspects of Browns legacy.  While not as activist as 
the work of many adherents of Critical Race Theory, Pattersons work is 
generally well-rounded. 
Derrick Bell, the main founder of Critical Race Theory in the 1970s,13 has 
 
7. Referring to GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 401. 
8. For more on the dimensions of Critical Race Theory from a variety of perspectives, see 
KIMBERLE CRENSHAW, NEIL GOTANDA, & KENDALL THOMAS, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE 
KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (1995) and RICHARD DELGADO, CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (1995). 
9. BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 181 (1994). 
10. CRENSHAW ET AL., supra note 8, at xxv. 
11. Id. at xxxii. 
12. See Derrick A. Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992). 
13. CRENSHAW ET AL., supra note 8, at xi (quoting Cornel West).  While many other 
theorists have embraced Critical Race Theory, due to the measured space of a book review and 
Derrick Bells status as primary founder of Critical Race Theory, this Book Review mainly limits 
its discussion of Critical Race Theory to some of the key ideas about which Bell has theorized. 
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theorized about a number of insightful concepts that help to drive the analysis 
of this Book Review.  Particularly appropriate for application to the material 
Patterson discusses are the ideas of equality of opportunity versus equality of 
result, involuntary black sacrifice, white self-interest, and single-race schools.  
This section of the Book Review will address these concepts in turn. 
A. Equality of Opportunity Versus Equality of Result 
Although not specifically using the terms, Pattersons book suggests that, 
in the wake of Brown, equality of opportunity has not led to equality of result 
for many minorities.  As Bell notes, equality of opportunity does not guarantee, 
and often does not produce, equality of result.14  Equality of opportunity is the 
requirement that the law offer the same chance to people of all races, while 
equality of result considers whether people of all races actually experience 
equality.15  Bell claims that equality of opportunity alone is inadequate because 
it ignores the political import and social significance of race and a long history 
of subordination and exploitation.16 
The effects of school desegregation differ depending on whether one 
considers equality of opportunity or equality of result.  In terms of equality of 
opportunity, the text of Brown itself clearly has put an end to legalized 
segregation in public schools.  Chief Justice Earl Warren stated so in a succinct 
manner: We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 
separate but equal has no place.17  However, Pattersons evidence suggests 
that equality of opportunity18 has not led to equality of result.  As noted above, 
Patterson points out that several major cities like Chicago and Detroit still have 
predominantly minority school populations (p. 211).  In part, this result may be 
because Chicago and Detroit have large minority populations.  However, the 
90% figures are so one sided that one must ask what has happened.  No doubt 
many well-to-do Whites have left the city limits (p. 164).  Regardless, many 
minorities remain in inner-city schools and undoubtedly must face the problems 
of crime, drugs, and under funding.  It is easy to imagine how such problems 
erode the learning of minority students. 
 
14. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 136 (2000). 
15. Id.  See also Derrick Bell, Xerces and the Affirmative Action Mystique, 57 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1595 (1989) (addressing equality of opportunity and equality of result in the context of 
affirmative action). 
16. BELL, supra note 14, at 136. 
17. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
18. One could argue that equality of opportunity in terms of rights that the law protects is 
not the same as equality of opportunity in terms of the resources that the government owes to 
minority students.  The legal opportunity can be present, but the material opportunity may not be.  
For example, a minority student may have the right to be free of racial discrimination in 
education, but the student may not have access to books, computers, well-trained teachers, and 
other resources that can help him or her succeed.  Hence, the concept of equality of opportunity is 
a somewhat fluid one. 
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If, like Patterson, one can accept the traditional notion of standardized 
tests as an important measure of ability,19 then the overall lower SAT 
performance by Blacks compared to the performance by Whites would be 
evidence of educational shortcoming (p. 215).  Furthermore, the income 
prospects for Blacks, which are two-thirds of what such prospects are for 
Whites, look so bleak that many Blacks may have no motivation to succeed on 
tests such as the SAT (p. 216).  This result might contribute to a self-fulfilling 
prophecy of failure.  Thus, despite the noble words of Brown, Pattersons 
evidence shows that many minority students still face substantial obstacles to 
equality of result in education. 
As Patterson points out, more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence appears 
to lack concern for equality of result as well.  The 1992 case Freeman v. Pitts20 
illustrates this point.  In Freeman, the plaintiffs sued because in one Georgia 
county over half of all students were attending schools that were 90% or more 
black.  County officials claimed that private decision-making, not government 
action, led to resegregation of the schools.  In reply, the Court held that private 
decisions that lead to resegregation are beyond the realm of constitutional 
concern (p. 198). 
A Critical Race Theory critique of Freeman likely would point out that, 
 
19. This assumption about standardized testing has come under scrutiny.  See, e.g., Susan 
Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Idea, 84 CAL. 
L. REV. 953 (1996) (arguing that a U.S. testocracy abstracts data from individuals, quantifies 
those individuals based on numerical rankings, exaggerates its ability to predict those individuals 
future performance, and then disguises under the rubric of qualifications the selection of those 
who are more socio-economically privileged).  To develop their position, Sturm and Guinier 
have maintained that students whose parents can afford test preparation courses tend to do the best 
on standardized tests.  Id. at 991.  In addition, Sturm and Guinier argue that the correlation 
between standardized aptitude test scores like scores from the SAT and LSAT and first-year 
grades in academic programs like college or law school is lower than the correlation between a 
persons weight and his or her height.  Id. at 971.  On these last two points, according to Sturm 
and Guinier, standardized test scores tell more about a students past than his or her future.  Id. at 
991.  Furthermore, standardized testing assumes that only one correct way of doing something 
exists, even in cases of complex problems, and that humans have objective ways of evaluating 
such performance.  Id. at 986-87.  For some alternatives to the use of standardized admissions 
tests, see Richard Delgado, Official Elitism or Institutional Self Interest?  10 Reasons Why UC-
Davis Should Abandon the LSAT (and Why Other Good Law Schools Should Follow Suit), 34 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 593, 611-14 (2001) (suggesting, among other approaches, making admissions 
tests optional, guaranteeing admission based on factors like grades, and admitting larger first-year 
classes). 
Not all observers share this concern over standardized admissions tests.  For arguments in 
favor of the status quo, see Dan Subotnik, Goodbye to the SAT, LSAT?  Hello to Equity by 
Lottery?  Evaluating Lani Guiniers Plan for Ending Race Consciousness, 43 HOW. L.J. 141 
(2000) and Gail L. Heriot & Christopher T. Wonnell, Standardized Tests Under the Magnifying 
Glass: A Defense of the LSAT Against Recent Charges of Bias, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 467 
(2003).  Given the sharp disagreement about traditional standardized testing, continuing 
examination of this issue is appropriate.  Nonetheless, the assumption of the validity of testing still 
persists in academia and elsewhere. 
20. 503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
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while the Court may recognize the right of children to attend integrated 
schools, the Court is unwilling to act in all cases to ensure such integration.  
Thus, the black children in the resegregated county have the legal right to 
attend integrated schools, but when the decisions of private individuals 
interfere with that right, the Court is not concerned with the problem.  Critical 
Race Theory advocates may argue that it matters little whether governmental 
actors or private individuals are denying the children a well-funded and 
integrated education; the children still lose.  With this point in mind, a Critical 
Race Theory perspective would observe that the government, here the Court, 
should act to remedy this problem because the harm remains; using the rubric 
of non-governmental action is an insufficient excuse for permitting children to 
lose life-shaping educational opportunities. 
In fairness to the Court, one should note that this argument is particularly 
difficult to sustain because of the need for plaintiffs to prove state action in 
equal protection cases.21  Unless the government somehow supports private 
action, no equal protection violation can result.  Although the students lose out, 
legally there is no party at which to point a finger. 
Thus, an application of the concepts of equality of opportunity and 
equality of result to the legacy of Brown, including the relatively recent 
Freeman decision, leads to essentially the same concerns over results that 
Patterson articulates in his book.  Through Brown and its progeny, the law may 
support minority children, but many such children still suffer educationally.  To 
a great extent, then, Pattersons analysis tracks analysis that would come from a 
Critical Race Theory perspective. 
B. Involuntary Black Sacrifice 
Although Pattersons analysis does not explicitly call upon the notion of 
involuntary black sacrifice, his analysis does indicate that desegregation has 
failed many black individuals.  Nevertheless, his analysis also considers the 
positive moral stance of the Brown decision and its heirs.  Involuntary black 
sacrifice is another idea that Bell offers in developing Critical Race Theory.22  
The concept of involuntary black sacrifice holds that, in an effort to reconcile 
their differences, various groups of Whites sacrifice black interests, much as 
humans in mythology would sacrifice animals to reconcile differences with the 
gods.23 
One historical example of black sacrifice is the Civil War era 
emancipation of slaves.  At first blush, freedom from slavery would look like a 
 
21. The U.S. Constitution generally limits governmental rather than private action.  
WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
1107 (1998). 
22. BELL, supra note 14, at 53-55. 
23. Id. at 54. 
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major step forward for Blacks, but proponents of Critical Race Theory maintain 
otherwise.24  Arguably, the process of freeing slaves allowed the North to 
weaken the South by undermining the southern social structure and thereby 
ultimately preserved the Union.  However, the South retained its white-over-
black hierarchy of Jim Crow.  The North and the South settled their dispute and 
Blacks retained second-class status, if that at all, in the United States.  Nowhere 
in the result did the parties with power seriously address the problems of 
African Americans.25 
As suggested, Patterson sees Brown as a case whose legacy is mixed.  On 
one hand, segregated inner-city school systems like the overwhelmingly black 
school system in Detroit illustrate the limits of Brown (p. 211).  Clearly, this 
type of issue remains a problem.  Additionally, Patterson discusses cases like 
Milliken v. Bradley,26 in which the plaintiffs alleged inequities in the racial 
balance in Detroit schools to show how the Supreme Court began to back away 
from its liberal position of 1954 (p. 178).  As Patterson points out, 
approximately 72% of inner-city school children in Milliken were black (pp. 
178-79).  The plaintiffs hoped to obtain an inter-district busing arrangement 
with Detroits suburbs to remedy the problem.  Although the Court found 
disparate treatment of white and black students in Detroit, the Court held that, 
absent any evidence that the suburban districts intended to discriminate, an 
inter-district busing remedy was inappropriate (pp. 179-80).  In effect, the 
Court held that the plaintiffs had suffered a legal wrong but were not due a 
correction of that wrong.  NAACP attorney Nathaniel Jones observed, [t]he 
Court has said to black people[,] You have rights but you dont have a 
remedy.  Were back in the same position as we were before Dred Scott (p. 
180).27 
On the other hand, despite shortcomings like these, Patterson views 
Brown as an opinion that took aim at the heart of constitutionally sanctioned 
Jim Crow and helped to desegregate many schools in both the border states 
and the South (p. 221).  Additionally, Patterson points out that, in the wake of 
Brown, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act28 has opened the door for 
 
24. Id. at 54-55. 
25. See also Derrick Bell, Here Come de Judge: The Role of Faith in Progressive 
Decision-Making, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 8-9 (1999) (considering slavery in the U.S. Constitution, 
the Compromise of 1877, and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), as other examples of 
involuntary black sacrifice); Derrick A. Bell, Californias Proposition 209: A Temporary 
Diversion on the Road to Racial Disaster, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1447, 1455-56 (1997) (pointing 
to the recurring nature of involuntary sacrifice in the United States). 
26. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
27. Patterson adds that Justice William Douglas, dissenting in Milliken, claimed that the 
Court had labeled Detroits schools not only separate but inferior. 
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (prohibiting public and private employers from 
discriminating based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). 
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minorities in the employment context, while the 1965 Voting Rights Act29 has 
granted equal access in voting (pp. 124, 127).  Today, few people would 
seriously challenge the notion that minorities are due the legal rights of 
discrimination-free employment and voting.30  These points suggest that 
Patterson does not fully embrace the notion of black sacrifice in the post-Brown 
world. 
In contrast, adherents of Critical Race Theory would go further than 
Patterson.  They would argue that the results of Brown a half-century after the 
Court issued the decision show that Blacks are again victims of the 
reconciliation of tensions between white factions.  In this case, the quarreling 
white parties were the segregationists and the desegregationists.  The result in 
Brown pleased the desegregationists because schools had a new legal duty to 
integrate and, indeed, many schools adhered to that duty.  However, the 
segregationists received a portion of what they wanted in that they were able to 
delay the process of desegregation.  Moreover, today major inner-city school 
systems in cities like Chicago and Detroit are largely segregated.  As the 
aforementioned points about Blacks gaining a weaker education in poorer 
inner-city schools and performing at lower levels on the SAT would suggest, 
African Americansthis time as studentsare left behind once again.  An 
adherent of Critical Race Theory could point out that this result is akin to the 
result of the infamous Plessy v. Ferguson31 decision that came in the wake of 
the Fourteenth Amendments32 ratification; again, the white power structure has 
not kept its promises to the black minority. 
 Specifically, an adherent of Critical Race Theory would hone in on 
Pattersons Milliken example and argue that Milliken was just one more 
occasion for black sacrifice.  Under this paradigm, the liberal desegregationists 
and more conservative separatist forces disagreed about what, if anything, to do 
about the disproportionately high number of black students in inner-city Detroit 
 
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (1965).  For an unorthodox perspective on the beginnings of 
the Voting Rights Act, see Brian K. Landsberg, Sumter County, Alabama and the Origins of the 
Voting Rights Act, 54 ALA. L. REV. 877 (2003) (addressing the relationship between events in one 
Alabama county and the famous 1965 federal legislation). 
30. One might point out that being entitled to these rights is not necessarily the same as 
being able to benefit from these rights.  For example, a critique of voting rights in the United 
States would point out that many minority individuals in Florida were unable to enjoy their right 
to vote during the controversial 2000 presidential election.  See, e.g., John C. Knechtle, One 
Person, One Vote Magnified, 2 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 381, 385 (2001) (expressing concern about 
the equal protection voting rights of minorities in districts with less accurate voting machinery); 
Allan J. Lichtman, What Really Happened in Floridas 2000 Presidential Election, 32 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 221 (2003) (pointing out that ballots of black voters had a much higher set-aside rate than 
ballots of white voters). 
31. 163 U.S. 537 (holding that racially separate public facilities were constitutional so long 
as they were equal). 
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (guaranteeing equal protection to all individuals, 
including Blacks). 
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schools.  After the legal battle, the desegregationists received a blessing from 
the Court that their concern over racial discrimination in Detroit schools was 
legitimate.  Meanwhile, the more conservative forces had their way in that they 
did not have to take action to solve the problem.  In the end, the black students 
remained trapped in inner-city schools that were poorly funded and probably 
less safe than the schools in the Detroit suburbs (pp. 179-80).  As such, the 
pendulum is swinging back in the direction of black sacrifice.33 
Accordingly, although Patterson recognizes the limitations of the Brown 
legacy, he never maintains that, in light of Brown, various groups of Whites 
have settled their differences by ignoring the needs of Blacks.  Indeed, 
Patterson argues that one can see the positive side of the Brown legacy.  Thus, 
he considers both weaknesses and strengths of Brown and its ensuing legacy. 
C. White Self-Interest 
Although to a lesser extent than with involuntary black sacrifice, Patterson 
hints at the concept of white self-interest.  Quite simply put, this Critical Race 
Theory concept is one in which Whites act in a way that benefits them and, if 
their action happens to be beneficial to Blacks or other minorities, then the 
result is merely a fortunate coincidence for minorities.34  Under this concept, 
white actors do not actively consider the needs of racial minorities. 
Several pieces of evidence in the book merely hint at white self-interest.  
For instance, Patterson notes that Brown created feelings of guilt and 
responsibility among many liberal Whites (p. 221).  Assumedly, Whites 
wanted to purge these unpleasant feelings, although Patterson does not state so 
explicitly.  Also, Patterson maintains that Brown took aim at the heart of 
constitutionally sanctioned Jim Crow (p. 221).  This statement implies that the 
Whites who issued the decision may have enhanced their images by taking the 
high moral ground.  Despite several more such references, Patterson never 
argues outright that Brown was self-serving of white interests. 
An adherent of Critical Race Theory would be much more explicit than 
Patterson.  Indeed, Bell has argued that much of the progress that followed 
Brown served the interests of the Whites who brought about the changes.35  For 
 
33. In fairness to the Supreme Court, a critique of this Critical Race Theory analysis would 
point out that the Court in Milliken faced a problem where the requested solution, inter-district 
busing, would have placed a burden on entities apparently not discriminating against black 
students.  The Court found discriminatory intent in the Detroit schools but failed to find 
discriminatory intent in the suburban schools.  Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974).  
Thus, the Court had to decide whether to hold non-discriminating schools responsible.  Arguably, 
the Court decided against disciplining the schools in the Detroit suburbs for what the Detroit 
schools were doing. 
34. BELL, supra note 14, at 205-08. 
35. Id.  Bell also has referred to this concept as the interest convergence dilemma.  See 
Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. 
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example, Brown provided credibility to the U.S. government during the Cold 
War.  The decision also gave governmental assurance to Blacks that the 
freedoms for which Blacks had fought during World War II would be available 
to them at home after the conflict ended.36  With regard to these points, the U.S. 
government could avoid looking hypocritical; instead, it could take the high 
moral ground on the world stage.  From this perspective, Whites in power did 
not have the interests of Blacks at heart. 
To an extent, Bells analysis can make sense, but implying that the 
decision rests on weaker moral ground because Brown served white interests 
misses an important point.  In one way or another, acts of goodwill toward 
others are by nature self-serving.  For instance, the social worker who works 
with the poor probably derives pleasure from helping people in need or from 
trying to achieve personal standards of morality.  This pleasure is self-serving 
in a way, but the pleasure the social worker receives by helping others does not 
detract from the act itself; those helped still receive the aid.  In the same vein, 
Brown was an act of goodwill from the white establishment towards the black 
community because the decision recognized that U.S. society had shortchanged 
many Blacks on educational opportunities.  While one might describe Brown as 
self-serving, the decision still opened the door to helping Blacks make progress 
toward achieving a better place in society. 
Although Patterson stops well short of making the argument that an 
adherent of Critical Race Theory like Bell would make, Pattersons hesitancy 
does not necessarily undermine his overall conclusion about the simultaneous 
presence of negative and positive implications of Brown.  Given the noted 
limitation in the concept of white self-interest, one should not fault Patterson 
for largely omitting the argument. 
D. Single-Race Schools 
Finally, while he does consider options besides desegregation, Patterson 
does not address the concept of single-race schools.  Bell discusses the concept 
of single-race schools as an alternative to integrated schools.37  He notes that 
such schools aim to promote a sense of cultural pride among black students 
 
L. REV. 518 (1980) (critiquing the Brown decision).  For more on Brown and interest 
convergence, see Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education: Forty-Five Years After the Fact, 26 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 171, 197 (2000) and DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD 
OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 59-68 (2004) [hereinafter 
BELL, SILENT COVENANTS].  For more recent examples of white self-interest, see Derrick Bell, 
Diversitys Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 (2003) (looking at Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306 (2003), and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), as instances of white self-interest) 
and BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra, at 149-51 (focusing on Justice Sandra Day OConnors 
opinion in Grutter). 
36. BELL, supra note 14, at 207. 
37. The single-race schools of which Bell is thinking are those that exist by choice rather 
than those that have existed as a function of de facto segregation.  BELL, supra note 14, at 222. 
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and are designed to address problems, including discrimination, joblessness, 
poverty, and crime[,] that Blacks often face disproportionately in comparison 
with members of other races.38 
Although he does consider that desegregation might not have been the 
best remedy for addressing the situation of Blacks in the United States, 
Patterson does not say much about single-race schools.  Specifically, Patterson 
offers the testimony of a black woman from Wilmington, North Carolina, who 
attended a black-only high school and was later concerned because, when her 
high school had to desegregate, Blacks felt like outsiders in their own school 
(p. 168-69).  The implication is that desegregation may not always help 
minority students.  Patterson also mentions that in the 1990s some black leaders 
questioned the assumption that desegregation was an appropriate remedy for 
educational shortcomings (p. 201).  Nonetheless, this analysis leaves open the 
door to single-race schools as an alternative remedy. 
An adherent of Critical Race Theory likely would take issue with 
Pattersons neglect of discussing single-race schools as a viable alternative to 
desegregation; indeed, such an adherent even may maintain that this type of 
neglect is illustrative of hidden white racism.39  In focusing on desegregation
the major white solution to black educational problemsPatterson virtually 
ignores the minority solution of single-race schools and thus inadvertently 
stifles the minority voices in the discussion on how to remedy educational 
shortcomings. 
This Critical Race Theory critique does make a point.  Given that the 
nature of Pattersons historical evaluation stems from the quest of Brown to 
integrate schools, the authors focus on mixed schools is understandable.  Yet, 
in considering the effects of Brown after a half-century, Patterson at least could 
offer a concise discussion of single-race schools as one possible alternative to 
integration.  After all, Patterson admits that integration has not worked 
perfectly, as he suggests when he discusses black performance on tests such as 
the SAT (p. 215).  Thus, Bells point that single-race schools can help to 
address culturally specific problems merits serious attention. 
CONCLUSION 
As this Book Review has argued, Patterson has offered a mostly balanced, 
critical historical narrative in Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights 
Milestone and Its Troubled Legacy.  Analysis of Pattersons book through a 
Critical Race Theory lens has helped to test the conclusions of the book.  
Specifically, consideration of the notion of equality of opportunity versus 
equality of result led to much the same conclusion that Patterson reaches.  
 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 139 (referencing Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987)). 
PEDRIOLI.MACRO 4/5/2005  9:22 PM 
2005] UNDER A CRITICAL RACE THEORY LENS 105 
However, an adherent of Critical Race Theory most likely would apply a 
harsher critique to the efforts at racial reform that have come in the wake of 
Brown, especially with regard to the concepts of involuntary black sacrifice, 
white self-interest, and single-race schools.  While Pattersons work deserves 
some criticism for not discussing single-race schools as a serious alternative 
remedy, the radical nature of Critical Race Theorywhich often focuses 
exclusively on the negativeleaves room for Patterson to address the positive 
aspects of Brown that adherents of Critical Race Theory would be inclined to 
ignore.  Because his narrative considers both the negative and positive 
implications of Brown, Patterson comes acceptably close to presenting a 
balanced historical evaluation. 
In summing up his position, Patterson effectively weighs the historical 
evidence by calling upon the following thoughts of former Legal Defense and 
Education Fund attorney Jack Greenberg:  Altogether, school desegregation 
has been a story of conspicuous achievements, flawed by marked failures, the 
causes of which lie beyond the capacity of lawyers to correct.  Lawyers can do 
right, they can do good, but they have their limits.  The rest of the job is up to 
society.40  Half a century after Brown, this is a relatively fair description of 





















40. Quoting GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 401. 
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